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Abstract
Incomplete information games, local interaction games and random matching games are all special cases of a general class of interaction games (Morris
(1997)). In this paper, we use this equivalence to present a uniÞed treatment of arguments generating uniqueness in games with strategic complementarities by introducing heterogeneity in these di¤erent settings. We also
report on the relation between local and global heterogeneity, on the role
of strategic multipliers and on puriÞcation in the three types of interaction
game.

¤

This paper was prepared for the Santa Fe Institute conference on “The Economy as an
Evolving, Complex System III”, November 2001. This paper incorporates our earlier notes
circulated under the title “Big Noise, Little Noise.” The authors are grateful for very valuable
discussions with Sandeep Baliga, David Frankel, Atsushi Kajii, Ady Pauzner, Takashi Ui and
Akos Valentinyi.
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1. Introduction
In an incomplete information game, players are uncertain about the environment
that they are in. We can represent their uncertainty by saying that each player
is one of a large set of possible types, and the type proÞle for all players is drawn
from some distribution. In random matching games, a large population of players
are interacting; which player is randomly matched with which other player is
determined by a random draw. In a local interaction game, a large number of
players are located either physically or socially in a network of relations with
other players; a player’s payo¤ depend on his own actions and the actions of
players who are close to him in the network. These three classes of games share
the feature that each player/ type of a player will want to choose an action that
is a best response to a distribution of his opponents’ actions. In the incomplete
information case, one type of one player is uncertain which type(s) of his (known)
opponent(s) he is facing. In the random matching case, each player is uncertain
which opponent he is facing. In the local interaction case, each player is facing a
distribution of actions by nearby players. In fact, all these classes of games can
be shown to be special cases of a class of “Interaction Games” (Morris (1997)).
This equivalence throws new light on old problems by drawing out the analogies
between di¤erent categories of models and suggesting new directions in which to
take the analysis1 . By highlighting the common elements in the structure of the
arguments, it allows us to identify the essential elements in the arguments.
In this paper, we focus on one particular set of issues and see how they translate across di¤erent types of interaction games. Complete information games
with strategic complementarities often have multiple equilibria. Introducing heterogeneity often reduces the amount of multiplicity. A simple intuition for why
this might be the case comes from thinking about a symmetric payo¤ game with
continuous actions. In this case, we can look for (symmetric) equilibria by looking
at the best response function of the game. In a game with strategic complementarities, this best response function will be increasing. The set of equilibria will
correspond to the set of points where the best response function b (.) crosses the
450 line, as illustrated in Þgure 1.
[Figure 1 here]
1
For example, the results in Morris (2000) were obtained by translating results about approximate common knowledge in incomplete information games into a local interaction setting:
the local interaction analogue of almost common knowledge events is cohesive neighborhoods,
where all players have most of their neighbors within the neighborhood.
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Now suppose that we introduce heterogeneity of some kind, so that a player is no
longer sure that his opponent is choosing the same action as him, but instead has
a di¤use belief over his opponents’ actions. This will tend to smooth out the best
response function, perhaps generating uniqueness. Such heterogeneity can be generated by incomplete information, local interaction or random matching. Various
papers in the literature generate uniqueness by adding heterogeneity, including (1)
for incomplete information, the global games analysis of Carlsson and van Damme
(1993) and Morris and Shin (1998, 2000), quantal response equilibria of McKelvey
and Page (1995) and the arms race game of Baliga and Sjomstrom (2001); and
(2) for random matching, Herrendorf, Valentinyi and Waldmann (2000). We will
describe a formal model that will translate naturally from incomplete information to random matching to local interaction settings where we can see how the
heterogeneity implies uniqueness argument works in general (in sections 2 and 3).
One immediate beneÞt of our exercise is the reconciliation of two themes in
the literature that are apparently at odds with each other. On the one hand,
there are arguments that show how very small but highly correlated heterogeneity
generates uniqueness (e.g., the global games papers above). Such arguments often
require su¢ciently small heterogeneity to guarantee uniqueness. On the other
hand, there are some arguments where large independent heterogeneity is required
for uniqueness (e.g., among the papers listed above, McKelvey and Page (1995),
Baliga and Sjostrom (2001) and Herrendorf, Valentinyi and Waldmann (2000)).
On the surface, these apparently contradictory results present a confused picture of this Þeld. However, this appearance is deceptive. When the underlying
nature of the strategic uncertainty is formalized properly, there is a common framework that ties together these disparate results in the literature. That framework
is one where we can separate out the uncertainty concerning the underlying fundamentals of the game (such as uncertainty over payo¤ parameters), from the
strategic uncertainty facing the players, which has to do with the uncertainty over
the actions of the other players. Stated loosely, what matters for uniqueness is
that the strategic uncertainty be quite insensitive to a player’s type. Thus, when
taken to extreme, the conditions that are most conducive for uniqueness are those
in which strategic uncertainty is invariant to a player’s type. In some cases,
such invariance is best achieved by having very small noise, but in other cases,
invariance results from very large noise. From these insights, we can provide a
su¢cient condition for uniqueness that naturally embeds both cases. We do this
in section 4.
Another theme explored here is the idea of strategic multipliers (section 5).
4

Cooper and John (1988) noted that, in games with strategic complementarities,
it is useful to distinguish two mechanisms by which an increased desirability of
an action translates into higher equilibrium actions. First, given the actions of
one’s opponents, each player has a private incentive to increase his own action.
Second, each player anticipates that others will also raise their actions, giving rise
to a multiplier e¤ect. Versions of this e¤ect are labelled the social multiplier in
the local interaction literature (see, e.g., Glaeser and Scheinkman (2000)). In an
incomplete information context, Morris and Shin (2000, section 3) have noted how
private information about the desirability of raising one’s action has less impact
than equally informative public information. Intuitively, public information tells
you not only that it is desirable for you to raise your action, but also that others
will be doing so. There is a publicity multiplier that is the analogue of the social
multiplier in the local interaction literature.2 In the case where small heterogeneity
generates uniqueness (e.g., the global games case), it is also useful to distinguish
a third mechanism by which an increased desirability of an action translates into
higher equilibrium actions. The strategic multiplier of Cooper and John (1988)
is a comparative statics concept applied to a particular equilibrium. It is an
intra-equilibrium notion, identifying how a complete information Nash equilibrium
varies as a payo¤ parameter favoring higher actions increases. In global games, we
also identify a point at which there is a jump from one equilibrium to another of
the complete information game. This inter-equilibrium e¤ect will locally be much
larger than the intra-equilibrium e¤ect and it is useful to distinguish them. Of
course, this combination of e¤ects arises in local interaction and random matching
games, as well as in incomplete information games.
A Þnal issue that we touch on is the puriÞcation of mixed strategy equilibria
(in section 6). The classical interpretation of mixed strategies is that players
are deliberately randomizing. The Bayesian interpretation of mixed strategies
says that players do not deliberately randomize; rather, a player’s mixed strategy
represents other players’ uncertainty about that player’s pure strategy. Harsanyi
(1973) showed that for any mixed strategy equilibrium of a complete information
game, if we added a small amount of independent payo¤ shocks to each player’s
payo¤s, the induced incomplete information game would have a pure strategy
equilibrium that converged - in average behavior - to the original mixed strategy
equilibrium as noise goes to zero. In his 1950 thesis (reprinted in Nash (2001)),
Nash gave a large population analogue of the Bayesian view of mixed strategies:
in a large population, each player may follow a pure strategy but will have a
2

Morris and Shin (2001b) investigate this publicity multiplier in more detail.
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non-degenerate distribution over the play of his opponent. Average play in the
population will correspond to a mixed strategy of the underlying game. Of course,
in the interaction game interpretation, these arguments are one and the same.
Another class of games where heterogeneity generates uniqueness is dynamic
games. If a large number of players are unable to adjust their behavior at identical
times, they will similarly face non-degenerate beliefs about the population’s play,
again leading to uniqueness (see, e.g., Matsui and Matsuyama (1995), Morris
(1995), Frankel and Pauzner (2000) and Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (2001)).
However, the connection of such games to interaction games is not direct. We will
also discuss a (slightly contrived) dynamic interpretation of interaction games that
may help understand the relation to the dynamic uniqueness results, by analogy.
Our main purpose in this paper is to relate together some existing work by
ourselves and others in a way that sheds light on both the original results and
on the relationship between di¤erent classes of interaction games. In our survey
of the theory and applications of global games, Morris and Shin (2000), a section
called “Related Models: Local Heterogeneity and Uniqueness” touched on the issues raised in this paper. This paper can thus be seen as a detailed elaboration
of the argument there. The main results reported here are straightforward applications of the type of argument used in Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2001). Ui
(2001) discussed a class of games with “correlated quantal responses,” noting how
global games and McKelvey and Page’s (1995) quantal response equilibria could
be understood as special cases of the same class of games, with di¤erent correlation assumptions. This paper introduced the very valuable parameterization of
global games using correlation described in section 2. The relation between global
games and Harsanyi’s (1973) puriÞcation result was the subject of appendix B of
Carlsson and van Damme (1993).

2. Binary Action Leading Example
In this section, we Þrst introduce a simple a binary action example with a random
matching interpretation. Then we discuss alternative - incomplete information,
local interaction and dynamic - interpretations. We also note how the correlation
structure of players’ types could be related back to properties of private and
public signals. We also discuss the origins of this example and the relation to the
literature.

6

2.1. Example
Consider the following random matching game. Two players are randomly chosen
from a population. Each player i is characterized by a payo¤ parameter xi . The
payo¤s from their interaction are given by:

Player 1

Player 2
0
1
0 1, 1 0, x2
1 x1, 0 x1 , x2

(2.1)

We assume that the payo¤ parameter is normally distributed in the population
with mean y and standard deviation ¾. However, the draws from the population
are not independent: two players are more likely to be chosen to interact if they
have similar payo¤ parameters. Thus, x1 and x2 are jointly normally distributed
with correlation coe¢cient ½ (and each has mean y and standard deviation ¾). A
pure strategy in this game is a mapping s : R ! {0, 1}.
This is a ‘private values’ game in which a player knows the payo¤ to action 1.
In this sense, there is no fundamental uncertainty. The only type of uncertainty
facing a player is the strategic uncertainty over the opponent’s action, which
in turn is attributable to the uncertainty over the opponent’s payo¤ parameter.
When xi is either very high (greater than one) or very low (less than zero), player
i has a dominant action. Thus, strategic uncertainty is relevant for player i only
when xi lies between zero and one.
As a Þrst step to solving this game, let us Þrst look for equilibria in switching
strategies in which there is a threshold value x̂ below which a player chooses action
0, but above which he takes action 1. Since the game is symmetric, let us start
by looking for equilibria where this threshold value x̂ is common to both players.
The expected payo¤ to player 1 from taking action 0 when his own payo¤
parameter is x1 is given by
Prob (x2 < x̂|x1 )
His payo¤ to action 1 is x1 itself, and so action 1 is preferred when
x1 ¡ Prob (x2 < x̂|x1 ) > 0
Action 0 is preferred if this inequality is reversed. At any switching point x̂, a
player is indi¤erent between the two actions, so that
x̂ ¡ Prob (x2 < x̂|x̂) = 0
7

(2.2)

How many solutions are there of this equation? If there is more than one solution,
then we can construct more than one switching equilibrium. The question boils
down to how sensitive is the conditional probability Prob(x2 < x̂|x̂) with respect
to shifts in the switching point x̂. If this probability were invariant to shifts in
x̂, then (2.2) would imply that x̂ = c for some constant c, and we would have a
unique solution for x̂.
In our case, since x1 and x2 are jointly normal with equal variances, if player 1
has payo¤ parameter x1 , he will believe that x2 is distributed normally with mean
½x1 + (1 ¡ ½) y
and variance ¾ 2 (1 ¡ ½2 ). Thus,
Prob (x2 < x̂|x1 ) = ©

Ã

x
b ¡ ½x1 ¡ (1 ¡ ½) y
p
¾ 1 ¡ ½2

(2.3)
!

(2.4)

where © (.) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal. In
particular, when x1 = x̂,
Ã
!
(1 ¡ ½) x̂ ¡ (1 ¡ ½) y
p
Prob (x2 < x̂|x̂) = ©
¾ 1 ¡ ½2
r
¶
µ
x̂ ¡ y
1¡½
·
(2.5)
= ©
¾
1+½
Note two special cases of this conditional probability. First, when ¾ becomes large,
the expression inside the brackets in (2.5) goes to zero, so that Prob(x2 < x̂|x̂)
tends to the constant 1/2. In this limit, there is a unique solution to (2.2) given
by x̂ = 12 . However, there is a second special case that yields the same solution.
This is when ½ ! 1. When x1 and x2 become more and more highly correlated,
the conditional probability Prob(x2 < x̂|x̂) again tends to the constant 1/2.
The two special cases (¾ ! 1 and ½ ! 1) are instances where the strategic
uncertainty becomes invariant to a player’s type. Conditional on x̂, the probability that my opponent’s payo¤ parameter is less than x̂ does not depend on x̂
itself. The intuition for each case is easy to grasp. When ¾ becomes larger and
larger, the density over x approaches the uniform density, and so the area to the
left of any point x̂ tends to 1/2. The intuition for the case where ½ is close to
1 is quite di¤erent. When ½ is close to 1, the predictive value of knowing the
ex ante density over my opponent’s payo¤ parameter becomes small, since this is
8

swamped by my own signal. From (2.3), it is as likely for my oppenent’s payo¤
parameter to be above my own, as it is for it to be below my own.
Even away from this limit, when ¾ is large, or when ½ is close to one, the
strategic uncertainty is quite insensitive to a player’s type, in the sense that the
conditional probability Prob(x2 < x̂|x̂) does not vary much with respect to shifts
in x̂. If strategic uncertainty is su¢ciently “sticky” with respect to shifts in a
player’s type, there is a unique solution to (2.2).
With this insight, we can characterize the conditions that are necessary and
su¢cient for uniqueness of equilibrium. The following argument follows Morris
and Shin (2001a). Let u (x, x
b) be the payo¤ gain to choosing action 1 rather than
action 0 for type x when the opponent is following a switching strategy around x
b.
Thus,
!
Ã
x
b ¡ ½x1 ¡ (1 ¡ ½) y
p
.
u (x, x
b) = x ¡ ©
¾ 1 ¡ ½2
Observe that
U(x) = u (x, x)
Ã
= x¡©

(1 ¡ ½) (x ¡ y)
p
¾ 1 ¡ ½2

!

.

If U (b
x) = 0, then there is an equilibrium of this game where each player chooses
action 0 if his signal is below x
b and chooses action 1 if his signal is above x
b. If
we let x and x be the smallest and largest solutions to the equation U (x) = 0,
then action 1 is rationalizable for player i if and only if xi ¸ x and action 0 is
rationalizable if and only if xi á x.
Thus there is a unique rationalizable action for (almost) all types if and only
if the equation U (x) = 0 has a unique solution. Observe that U (x) ! ¡1 as
x ! ¡1 and U (x) ! 1 as x ! 1. So, a su¢cient condition for the equation to
have a unique solution is that U 0 (x) ¸ 0 for all x. But observe that if U 0 (x) < 0
for some y, we could choose another x0 and y0 such that the equation had multiple
solutions. So, there is a unique rationalizable action for (almost) all types and for
all y if and only if the equation U 0 (x) ¸ 0 for all x.
Ã
!
(1
¡
½)
(x
¡
y)
1
¡
½
p
U 0 (x) = 1 ¡ p
Á
¾ 1 ¡ ½2
¾ 1 ¡ ½2
!
Ã
r
1 1¡½
(1 ¡ ½) (x ¡ y)
p
.
= 1¡
Á
¾ 1+½
¾ 1 ¡ ½2
9

Thus for uniqueness, we must have
r
1 1¡½ 1
p ¸ 0.
1¡
¾ 1 + ½ 2¼
Re-writing, this gives
1
¾ ¸
2¼
2

µ

1¡½
1+½

¶

(2.6)

We will refer to this as the uniqueness condition. There is a unique equilibrium
either if there is su¢cient variance of players’ private values or if those private
values are su¢ciently closely (but not perfectly) correlated3 .
2.2. Alternative Interpretations of the Example
2.2.1. An Incomplete Information Interpretation.
Let there be two players who will interact with each other for sure. But each player
i = 1, 2 is unsure of the other player’s private value (or “type”) xi . Suppose that
their private values are ex ante symmetrically and normally distributed. Then
the prior distribution over their private values / types is characterized by the
unconditional mean y, the unconditional variance ¾ 2 and the correlation coe¢cient
½. The uniqueness result says that if condition (2.6) is satisÞed, there will be a
unique equilibrium where each player chooses action 1 only if his type is above
some threshold. Note that if ½ were identically equal to zero, i.e., players types
were perfectly correlated, so that there was complete information, there would be
multiple equilibria whenever the players’ common type was between 0 and 1.
2.2.2. A Local Interaction Interpretation.
Let a continuum of players be situated on the real line. Let the density of players
be normal with mean y and variance ¾2 . Thus players are concentrated around
a location y, with a few players out at the tails. Suppose that a player’s private
value xi is identically equal to his location. If players interacted equally with
the whole population, i.e., there was uniform interaction, then a player would
be equally concerned about the actions of all players in the population, and he
would weight the action of players at a given location by the mass of players at
3
If private values are perfectly correlated (i.e., ½ = 1), there will be multiple equilibria
whenever the players in a match have a (common) private value between 0 and 1.
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that location. But we would like to capture the possibility that a player is more
likely to interact with players of a similar type himself - a feature of many real
interaction structures. This can be captured by letting the weights he puts on
his neighbors’ actions also depend on how close they are to him. If we assume
that his weights are generated by the conditional density of the bivariate normal
with common mean y, variance ¾2 and correlation coe¢cient ½ based on his own
location x, then the analysis of this problem is identical to the random matching
model above. The uniqueness result says that if condition (2.6) is satisÞed, there
will be a unique equilibrium where each player chooses action 1 only if he is
located to the right of some point. Note that if ½ were identically equal to zero,
i.e., players’ interacted only with players at the same location, there would be
multiple equilibria for all players located between 0 and 1.
2.2.3. A Dynamic Interpretation.
Let a continuum of players each live for one instant. We write x for a player who
lives at date x. Let players’ birth dates be normally distributed with mean y and
variance ¾2 . Thus players are concentrated around date y, with a few players out
at the tails. A player’s private value xi is identically equal to the date at which
he lives, so action 1 is becoming deterministically more desirable through time.
In particular, there is a date beyond which action 1 is dominant.
A player’s payo¤ depends on his own action, his payo¤ parameter and the
actions of others at di¤erent dates, both in the past and in the future. The
fact that payo¤s depend on actions of as yet unborn individuals is somewhat
unconventional, but provided that the actions in the future can be anticipated (as
will be the case here) institutions such as securities markets will enable players
living today to consume today.
If players interacted equally with the whole population, i.e., there was uniform
interaction, then a player would be equally concerned about the actions of all
players at all dates. But we would like to capture the possibility that a player is
more concerned about the actions of players choosing at around the same time.
This can be captured by letting the weights he puts on his neighbors actions also
depend on how close in time they live to him. If we assume that his weights are
generated by the conditional density of the bivariate normal with common mean
y, variance ¾2 and correlation coe¢cient ½, then the analysis of this problem
is identical to the random matching model above. The uniqueness result says
that if condition (2.6) is satisÞed, there will be a unique equilibrium where each
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player chooses action 1 only if he lives after some cuto¤ date. Note that if ½ were
identically equal to zero, i.e., players interacted only with players with whom they
interacted simultaneously, there would be multiple equilibria for all players living
between dates 0 and 1.
2.3. Interpreting the Correlation from Common and Idiosyncratic Components
In the incomplete information interpretation of the above example, one very natural reason why private values are correlated is that there is a common and an
idiosyncratic component in their private valuations. In particular, suppose that
the distribution of private values xi is derived in the following way. An unknown
µ is normal with mean y and precision ®. Each xi = µ + "i , where each "i is
independently normally distributed with mean 0 and precision ¯. This setting is
equivalent to the setting studied above, where we set
1
1
+
® ¯
¯
½ =
®+¯

¾2 =

Observe that with this re-interpretation, condition (2.6) becomes:
µ
¶
®
1
1
1
+ ¸
® ¯
2¼ ® + 2¯
or

®2 ¯
á 2¼.
(® + ¯) (® + 2¯)

(2.7)

This re-parameterization can also be applied to the random matching, local
interaction and dynamic interpretations discussed above.
Equation (2.7) nicely points to the two kinds of uniqueness arguments (correlated and independent heterogeneity) alluded to in the introduction. Note that
condition (2.7) is satisÞed either if ® is su¢ciently large and ¯ < 2¼ or if ¯ is
su¢ciently large for any given ®.4 In the former case, as ® ! 1, players types
are independent and the requirement that ¯ < 2¼, implies that there must be a
minimum amount of heterogeneity to get uniqueness. But in the latter case, as ¯
4

There is a more detailed discussion of this condition in the appendix.
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becomes large for any Þxed ®, players’ types become more and more closely correlated and very small heterogeneity (i.e., large ¯) is required for uniqueness. Note
that as ¯ ! 1, the variance of private values is reduced, which is bad according
to condition (2.6). But the increased correlation more than compensates.
2.4. Background and Related Literature
Let us start with incomplete information. The above example was discussed in
Carlsson and van Damme (1993), appendix B, with the common and idiosyncratic
components interpretation of section 2.3. Morris and Shin (2000) used a special
case of this example to illustrate the connection between di¤erent types of interaction games. Note that in the interpretation of section 2.3, the prior mean y is a
public signal of the common component µ, while private value xi is a private signal
of µ. In Morris and Shin (1999, 2000), we have examined the contrasting roles of
public and private signals in common value global games where players care only
about the value of µ. In the appendix, we brießy contrast the private value global
games analyzed in this paper with common value global games (which is the case
more generally studied in the literature).
Ui (2001) was the Þrst to combine the global games analysis with the very
useful parameterization in terms of the correlation of players’ signals. In the
normal case that has been much analyzed, this is a very fruitful way of understanding what is driving various uniqueness results. Ui used his global games with
correlated private values to explain the connection between global game uniqueness results (where small noise is required for uniqueness) and quantal response
equilibria (where large noise is required for uniqueness).
A number of papers have examined how su¢cient independent heterogeneity
gives rise to uniqueness in incomplete information games. McKelvey and Palfrey
(1995) introduced the idea of quantal response equilibria as a way of analyzing experimental results on games, exploiting existing discrete choice models employed
in econometrics. They assumed that each player has a payo¤ shock with a logistic
distribution. They noted that if the shocks were su¢ciently large, a player will
simply have a uniform distribution over his opponent’s actions, and thus will have
a unique best response. Thus uniqueness is a consequence of su¢ciently large
heterogeneity. Myatt and Wallace (1997) consider a two player two action coordination game with independent normal payo¤ shocks. Their prime focus is on
what happens with small shocks with an evolutionary dynamic. However, they
also note that uniqueness also arises automatically, even without the evolutionary
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dynamic, if the heterogeneity is su¢ciently large. Baliga and Sjostrom (2001) analyze a two player two action coordination game with independent heterogeneous
payo¤s, and give a necessary and su¢cient condition for uniqueness.5
Herrendorf, Valentinyi and Waldmann (2000) give a random matching argument showing that su¢cient heterogeneity implies uniqueness. Their argument
is embedded in a dynamic model that is not directly comparable; however, the
underlying logic is very close to the uniqueness result in the random matching
interpretation of the model described here.6 Ciccone and Costain (2001) have
criticized the argument of Herrendorf, Valentinyi and Waldmann (2000) on the
grounds that su¢cient heterogeneity incidentally implies that a high proportion of
the population have a dominant strategy to play one action, or the other. Their
critique applies equally well to other interpretations of the model. Note, however, that when local heterogeneity generates uniqueness, the same criticism is
not valid.
In a local interaction setting, a number of papers have shown that local interaction allows the risk dominant action to spread contagiously by best response
dynamics alone (e.g., Blume (1995) and Ellison (1993)). These arguments have
been used to show fast convergence to the risk dominant outcome in evolutionary
settings. Small variations on the original contagion arguments can be used to
establish that a small amount of heterogeneity can pin down equilibrium, even
without dynamic/evolutionary considerations (see Morris (1997)). The local interaction interpretation of the above example is a continuum population formalization of such arguments (for this, consider the case where ® ! 0).
In the dynamic interpretation of the above example, we assumed that each individual lived for an instant but cared about the actions of people making choices
at di¤erent (but - in the correlated case - nearby) times. We also assumed that
payo¤s depended on the time at which you were choosing. This introduced correlated heterogeneity: each player with given payo¤ parameter understood that
he was interacting with players with di¤erent payo¤ parameters. A number of
related ways of introducing correlated heterogeneity have been employed in the
5

Baliga and Sjostrom’s (2001) su¢cient condition applies to a two player two action coordination game with independent private values, and thus corresponds to the model of this section
in the case where ½ = 0. They consider a case where there is only one “dominance region” and
a slightly di¤erent paramerization of payo¤s. However, adapted to the setting of this paper,
their uniqueness condition reduces to (2.6) - with ½ = 0 - in the special case of the normal
distribution. We are grateful to Sandeep Baliga for helping me clarify the relation.
6
In a private communication, Valentinyi has suggested that the underlying logic of their
paper is well captured by the above example in the special case where ® ! 1.
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literature. Closest to the story we just told, Adsera and Ray (1998) assume that a
player’s payo¤ depends on his own current action and lagged actions of others, for
technological reasons. Morris (1995) and Abreu and Brunnermeier (2001) assume
that players have asynchronized timing devices, so that while their payo¤s may
depend on contemporaneous actions, they care about actions of others choosing
at (slightly) di¤erent clock times. Matsui and Matsuyama (1995), Frankel and
Pauzner (2000) and Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (2001) assume that players’
payo¤s depend on contemporaneous actions, but each player can only occasionally revise his action choice. Thus his payo¤ depends on his action choice and the
action choices of others at (slightly) di¤erent real times. All these dynamic stories
have other signiÞcant di¤erences from the dynamic interpretation we o¤ered of the
above example. But highly but not perfectly correlated heterogeneity is playing
an analogous role.

3. A More General Model
We will build on the insights from the leading example to identify a set of conditions that are jointly su¢cient for uniqueness of equilibrium. The main theme is
that uniqueness follows from the insensitivity of strategic uncertainty with respect
to shifts in a player’s own type.
In general, shifts in strategic uncertainty ßow from shifts in the conditional
density over my opponent’s types as my own type changes. However, the very
simple nature of the payo¤s in the leading example meant we needed only to keep
track of one summary statistic of this conditional density over the opponent’s types
- namely the probability that my opponent’s type is lower than my own. With
more general payo¤s, stategic uncertainty will depend on the whole density, and so
when we attempt to deÞne the notion of the insensitivity of strategic uncertainty
with respect to one’s own type, the condition must be su¢ciently restrictive so
that it applies to the whole of the conditional density. Denoting by Fi (xj |xi ) the
conditional c.d.f. of xj given xi , the key property used in our argument is that
there exists ± > 0 such that for all xj and all ¢,
d
Fi ( xi + ¢| xi ) á ±.
dxi

(3.1)

This is a strong requirement, since ± has to satisfy this inequality for all xi and
¢. We dub this the condition of uniformly bounded marginals on di¤erences.
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However, we will show that many standard formulations of strategic uncertainty
accommodate special cases where this condition holds.
We will develop the general model in terms of a random matching problem, and
show later how the same framework can be given alternative interpretations. A
match consists of a player in role 1 and a player in role 2. Let xi 2 R be the payo¤
relevant type of the player in role i. Let f 2 ¢ (R2 ) be a probability density over
possible pairs of payo¤ relevant types. The action set A of each player is a subset
of the closed unit interval that contains 0 and 1. That is, {0, 1} µ A µ [0, 1].
The choice of 0 and 1 is not important per se, but our argument depends on the
action set being bounded and closed.
Let ui (ai , ¡, x) be a player’s payo¤ if he has role i, he chooses action ai , his
belief about his opponent’s action is ¡ and his payo¤ relevant type is x. We
assume that ui is continuous in ai . The action distribution ¡ is a c.d.f. on A,
where ¡ (a) is the probability that the action is less than a. A strategy for players
in role i is a mapping si : R ! A. Write
bi (sj , xi )
¡

for a role i player’s induced belief over his opponent’s actions when he has observed
signal xi and believes his opponent is following strategy sj . Thus
Z
b
¡i (sj , xi ) [a] = f ( xj | xi ) Isj (·)áa (xj ) dxj ,
xj

where
Isj (·)áa (xj ) =

½

1, if sj (xj ) á a
.
0, if sj (xj ) > a

Now a player’s payo¤ if he chooses action ai , his opponents follow strategy sj and
his payo¤ relevant type is xi , is
³
´
b i (sj , xi ) , xi .
ui ai , ¡

A strategy proÞle is a pair s = (s1 , s2 ). Now s is a population equilibrium if and
only if
³
´
b (sj , xi ) , xi
si (xi ) 2 arg maxui ai , ¡
ai 2A

for all i and xi .
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3.1. Special Properties of the Payo¤ Function
There are two important special cases to bear in mind. We say that ui has the
average action property if there exists u¤i : A2 × R ! R such that
0
1
Z
B
C
aj d¡ (aj ) , xi A .
ui (ai , ¡, xi ) = u¤i @ai ,
aj 2A

In this case, a player cares only about the expected action of his opponents.
2
We say that ui has the average utility property if there exists u¤¤
i : A ×R ! R
such that
Z
u¤¤
ui (ai , ¡, x) =
i (ai , aj , x) d¡ (aj )
aj 2A

In this case, there is a utility associated with each possible action of the opponent;
thus u¤¤
i (ai , aj , xi ) is a player’s utility if he chooses action ai , his opponent chooses
action aj , and his payo¤ relevant type is xi . Now ui (ai , ¡, xi ) is just the expected
value of u¤¤
i (ai , aj , xi ) if aj is drawn according to ¡.
In some very special cases, a game may satisfy both the average action property
and the average utility property. For example, if there exist gi : A × R ! R and
hi : A × R ! R such that
2
3
Z
6
7
aj d¡ (aj )5 + hi (ai , xi ) ,
ui (ai , ¡, xi ) = gi (ai , xi ) 4
aj 2A

then ui has the average action property, by setting

u¤i (ai , aj , xi ) = gi (ai , xi ) aj + hi (ai , xi )
and ui has also has the average utility property by setting
u¤¤
i (ai , aj , xi ) = gi (ai , xi ) aj + hi (ai , xi )
In the random matching interpretation, it is natural to assume the expected
utility property: this is simply the standard expected utility assumption for this
interpretation. On the other hand, if the expected utility property fails, the model
still makes sense. The decision maker just has non-expected utility preferences
over the opponent’s actions.
We will see that expected utility property may be less compelling in other
interpretations.
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3.2. Alternative Interpretations of the General Model
3.2.1. An Incomplete Information Interpretation
Now let there be two players, 1 and 2. Each player i has a type xi ; f (·) is
the probability distribution over players’ possible types; ui (ai , ¡, xi ) is player i’s
payo¤ if he chooses action ai , his belief about his opponent’s action is ¡ and his
payo¤ relevant type is xi . If the average utility property is satisÞed, we have a
standard game of incomplete information, where u¤¤
i (ai , aj , xi ) is player i’s payo¤
if he chooses action ai , his opponent chooses action aj and his payo¤ relevant type
is xi .
3.2.2. A Local Interaction Interpretation
Now let there be two roles, 1 and 2. Players in role 1 are connected to players in
role 2, and vice-versa, in an interaction network. Thus we have a bipartite graph
with two continua of vertices. Each player in each role has a payo¤ relevant type
xi . We assign a weight to each connection and we normalize the sum of weights
to 1. Thus f 2 ¢ (R2 ) is now a weighting function for the interaction graph. A
player’s utility depends on the weighted distribution of opponents’ actions.
While we will maintain the “roles” assumption in the analysis that follows,
all the results go through unchanged if we allow there to be only one role and
therefore drop the bipartite graph assumption.
In this interpretation, the average action property is more natural. It is a
maintained assumption, for example, in the analysis of Glaeser and Scheinkman
(2000).
3.3. Assumptions
We will be concerned with the following properties of the payo¤ functions:
A1 Strategic Complementarities: ui (ai , ¡, xi ) ¡ ui (a0i , ¡, xi ) ¸ ui (ai , ¡0 , xi ) ¡
ui (a0i , ¡0 , xi ) if ai ¸ a0i and ¡ dominates ¡0 in the sense of Þrst degree stochastic
dominance.
A2 Limit Dominance I: There exist xi and xi such that ui (0, ¡, xi ) > u (ai , ¡, xi )
for all ai 6= 0, ¡, and xi á xi ; and ui (1, ¡, xi ) > ui (ai , ¡, xi ) for all ai 6= 1, ¡, and
xi ¸ xi .
A3 State Monotonicity: ui (ai , ¡, xi ) ¡ u (a0i , ¡, xi ) is increasing in xi if ai ¸ a0i .
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A4 Uniformly Positive (·) Sensitivity to the State: There exists · such
that if a ¸ a0 and x ¸ x0 ,
[u (a, ¡, x) ¡ u (a0 , ¡, x)] ¡ [u (a, ¡, x0 ) ¡ u (a0 , ¡, x0 )] ¸ · (a ¡ a0 ) (x ¡ x0 ) .
A5 Uniformly Bounded (·) Sensitivity to Opponents’ Actions: There
exists · such that if
[u (a, ¡, x) ¡ u (a0 , ¡, x)] ¡ [u (a, ¡0 , x) ¡ u (a0 , ¡0 , x)] á · (a ¡ a0 ) |¡ ¡ ¡0 | ,
where
|¡ ¡ ¡0 | = sup |¡ (a) ¡ ¡0 (a)|
a2A

Note that A4 thus implies A3.
We will be concerned with the following properties of the probability distribution (or weighting function) f. We assume throughout that f is a non-atomic
density. We write fi ( xj | xi ) for the conditional density over on xj given xi and
Fi ( xj | xi ) for the corresponding c.d.f.
A6 Limit Dominance II: f has support including [x, x]2
A7 Stochastically Ordered Marginals: Fi (xj | xi ) is increasing in xi for all
xj .
A8 Uniformly Bounded (±) Marginals on Di¤erences: there is ± > 0 such
that for all x and ¢,
d
Fi ( xi + ¢| xi ) á ±.
dx
3.4. Examples
3.4.1. The Binary Action Example Revisited
The binary action example of section 2 satisÞes all the assumptions of the general
model. In particular, one can check that A4 is satisÞed with · = 1 (and this is
the highest value such that A4 holds); A5 is satisÞed with · = 1 (and this is the
lowest value such that A5 holds); and A8 is satisÞed with
s
1¡½
±=
2¼¾2 (1 + ½)
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(and this is the lowest value such that A8 holds). To show the last claim, note
that arguments in section 2 show that
Ã
!
¢ + (1 ¡ ½) (x ¡ y)
p
Fi ( x + ¢| x) = ©
¾ 1 ¡ ½2
so that

Ã
!
d
¢ + (1 ¡ ½) (x ¡ y)
(1 ¡ ½)
p
p
Á
Fi ( xi + ¢| xi ) =
dx
¾ 1 ¡ ½2
¾ 1 ¡ ½2
(1 ¡ ½)
1
p
p
á
2
¾ 1 ¡ ½ 2¼
s
1¡½
=
.
2¼¾ 2 (1 + ½)
3.4.2. The Smooth Symmetric Case
A smooth example in the spirit of Cooper and John (1988) will be used in a number
of the results that follow. Let there be a continuum of actions (A = [0, 1]); symmetric payo¤s (i.e., no roles); and the average action property. Thus u¤ (a, a, x)
will be any player’s payo¤ if he is takes a, the average action of his opponents
is a and his payo¤ relevant type is x. Assume that u¤ is twice di¤erentiable and
2 ¤
strictly concave in a ( @@au2 < 0). The latter assumption implies that each player
has a continuous best response to his opponents’ average action.
In the setting, the above assumptions translate as follows:
A1:

@ 2 u¤
@a@a

> 0.

A3:

@ 2 u¤
@a@x

> 0.

A4:

@ 2 u¤
@a@x

¸ ·.

A5:

@ 2 u¤
@a@a

á ·.

Note that in this setting, if we write b (a, x) for a player’s best response if the
average action of his opponents is a and he is type x, then b is well-deÞned and is
strictly increasing in a at any interior solution. The set of equilibria in the case
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of complete information (common knowledge of a common private value x) will
look as in Þgure 2.
[Figure 2 here]

4. Uniqueness
4.1. Uniqueness from Payo¤s Alone
We Þrst note that there are conditions ensuring uniqueness in interaction games
with strategic complementarities that do not exploit any properties of the interaction structure. Consider the smooth example discussed in the section 3.4.2 but
assume only A1 from the assumptions described in section 3.3. Note that the
slope of the best response function b will be:
2 ¤

@ u
db
.
= ¡ @a@a
@ 2 u¤
da
@a2

A su¢cient condition for uniqueness in the complete information game is that
db
< 1, i.e.,
da
¯ 2 ¤¯
¯@ u ¯
¯ @a@a ¯
¯ @ 2 u¤ ¯ < 1.
¯ @a2 ¯

This will also be a su¢cient condition for uniqueness in the interaction game for
any f. Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001) have noted this su¢cient condition for
uniqueness (they call it “Marginal Social Inßuence”) in a related interaction game
(they have discrete types). Cooper and John (1988) pointed out that a similar
condition was su¢cient with uniform interaction.
4.2. Uniqueness from Heterogeneity: A UniÞed Result
Often, then, there is multiplicity in the underlying complete information game.
Adding heterogeneity sometimes removes that multiplicity. As we discussed in
the introduction, two alternative approaches in the literature involve (1) global
heterogeneity (where a minimum amount of heterogeneity is required) and (2) local
heterogeneity (where a maximum amount of heterogeneity is sometimes required).
Here we give a uniÞed treatment to clarify the relationship.
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Proposition 4.1. If A1 through A8 are satisÞed, with ±· < · (where ·, · and ±
are deÞned in A4, A5 and A8 respectively), then the interaction game has a unique
strategy proÞle surviving iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
Thus for any given · and ·, there will be uniqueness if ± is low enough, i.e.,
if players’ beliefs about how other players’ types di¤er from their own are not too
sensitive to their own type. The su¢cient condition of the proposition is tight:
recall (from section 3.4.1) that in the binary action example of section 2, we had
· = · = 1 and
s
1¡½
±=
.
2¼¾ 2 (1 + ½)
Thus the requirement that ±· < · is equivalent (up to the inequality) to the tight
uniqueness condition (2.6) for the example.
This proposition is a variant of Theorem 1 of Frankel, Morris and Pauzner
(2001). We will sketch the argument and then highlight afterwards the small
di¤erences required for this setting. The proposition follows from two lemmas.
Lemma 4.2. If A1 (strategic complementarities), A3 (state monotonicity) and
A7 (stochastically ordered marginals) are satisÞed, then the interaction game has
a largest and smallest pure strategy proÞle (s and s) satisfying iterated deletion
of dominated strategies. Moreover, these strategy proÞles are monotonic and are
equilibria of the interaction game.
This is a consequence of standard arguments concerning supermodular games,
following Vives (1990) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
Lemma 4.3. If A1 through A8 are satisÞed, with ±· < ·, and s and s are
monotonic equilibria of the interaction game with s ¸ s, then s = s.
Proposition 4.1 follows immediately from these two lemmas, since lemma 4.3
establishes that the largest and smallest strategy proÞles surviving iterated deletion in lemma 4.2 must be the same.
Before jumping into the formal proofs, it is illuminating to sketch the outlines
of the argument using Þgure 3.
[Figure 3 here]
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For the purpose of this illustration, let us take the extreme case in which the
strategic uncertainty is invariant with respect to a player’s type in the sense that
the conditional distribution Fi (xi + ¢|xi ) is invariant to i’s type xi .
Suppose, for the sake of argument, s 6= s̄. Figure 3 illustrates. Now, consider
a new strategy s¤ which is derived from s by translating it to the left so that two
conditions are satisÞed. First, s¤ lies on or above s̄ for all x. Second, there is
some point x̂1 at which s¤ = s̄. Let z be the size of the translation. Figure 3
illustrates. We can always accomplish such a translation since the action set is
bounded, and the limit dominance condition ensures that both s̄ and s hit the
top and bottom of the action set. Let
ã1
be the optimal action of player 1 when his own type is x̂1 when he believes that
his opponent is playing according to s¤ . Since s¤ ¸ s̄, strategic complementarity
implies that
(4.1)
ã1 ¸ s̄ (x̂1)
Meanwhile, our working hypothesis that the strategic uncertainty is invariant to
shifts in x means that the beliefs around x̂1 are identical to the beliefs around
x̂1 + z. If the opponent follows s¤ , then the strategic uncertainty is identical at
x̂1 and x̂1 + z. The only di¤erence then is the higher payo¤ parameter at x̂1 + z.
By state monotonicity, we have
s (x̂1 + z) > ã1

(4.2)

From (4.1) and (4.2), we have s (x̂1 + z) > s̄ (x̂1 ). But Þgure 3 tells us that they
were constructed to be equal to each other. Hence, we have a contradiction. This
tells us that our initial hypothesis that s 6= s̄ cannot be valid. We must have
s = s̄ instead.
In the informal argument just sketched, we made heavy use of the invariance
of strategic uncertainty with respect to type. The full argument has to allow for
the fact that the strategic uncertainty can shift, but not shift too much.
The proof for lemma 4.3 proceeds as follows. Suppose that s 6= s. Then
translate s to the left until each player’s strategy in the translated proÞle lies
above his strategy under s, but such that the translated strategy just touches s
for some player at some point. Let z be the amount of the translation, let player 1
a1 at the point where the strategies touch. Write
(w.l.o.g) with type x
b1 be taking b
s¤ for the translated strategy proÞle. Thus
s¤i (xi ) = si (xi + z)
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for all i and xi , and
s1 (b
x1) = s¤1 (b
x1 ) .
Write
¢i (ai , a0i , ¡i , xi ) = ui (ai , ¡i , xi ) ¡ ui (a0i , ¡i , xi ) .

a1 , then
Since s¤2 lies above s2 , A1 implies that if a1 > b
³
´
³
´
b1 (s¤2, x
b 1 (s2 , x
¢1 a1 , b
a1 , ¡
b1 ) , x
b1 ¸ ¢1 a1 , b
a1 , ¡
b1) , x
b1 .

(4.3)

By A8, and since s¤2 is simply a translation of s2 , we have
³
´
¤
b
b
d ¡1 (s2 , x
b1 ) , ¡1 (s2, x
b1 + z) á ±z.

Now if a1 > b
a1 , then by A5,
¯ ³
´
³
´¯
¯
¯
b1 (s¤2 , x
b1 (s2, x
a1 , ¡
b1) , x
b1 ¡ ¢1 a1, b
a1 , ¡
b1 + z) , x
b1 ¯ á · (a1 ¡ b
a1 ) ±z
¯¢1 a1 , b

and thus
³
´
³
´
¤
b1 (s , x
b
¢1 a1 , b
¸
¢
a
a1 , ¡
b
+
z)
,
x
b
,
b
a
,
¡
(s
,
x
b
)
,
x
b
a1) ±z.
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
1 ¡ · (a1 ¡ b
2
2
(4.4)
a1 , then by A4,
Finally, observe that if a1 > b
´
³
³
´
b1 (s , x
b 1 (s , x
¢1 a 1 , b
a1 , ¡
b1 + z ¸ ¢1 a1 , b
a1 , ¡
b1 +· (a1 ¡ b
a1 ) z.
2 b1 + z) , x
2 b1 + z) , x
(4.5)
a1 )
Now (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5) together imply (for all a1 > b
³
´
(
)
´
³
b
¢
a
,
b
a
,
¡
(s
,
x
b
)
,
x
b
1
1 1
1
2
1
1
b1 (s2 , x
a1 , ¡
b1 + z) , x
b1 + z ¸
¢1 a1, b
(4.6)
+· (a1 ¡ b
a1 ) z ¡ · (a1 ¡ b
a1) ±z
³
´ )
(
b
a1 , ¡1 (s2 , x
b1 ) , x
b1
¢1 a1 , b
.
=
+ (· ¡ ·±) (a1 ¡ b
a1 ) z
a1, such that
Now observe that if A is a discrete set, then there exists a1 > b
³
´
b1 (s2 , x
¢1 a 1 , b
a1 , ¡
b1 ) , x
b1 = 0.
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If this were not true, b
a1 would optimal against s2 for types strictly greater than
x
b1 , contradicting our construction. But now we must have
´
³
b1 (s2 , x
¢1 a1 , b
a1 , ¡
b1 + z) , x
b1 + z > 0
for some a1 > b
a1, contradicting our assumption that s is an equilibrium.
If A is continuous, then we must have
³
´
b1 (s2 , x
a1 , ¡
b1 ) , x
b1
¢1 a1 , b
!0
a1 ¡ b
a1
as a1 # b
a1 . This implies that
´
³
b
¢1 a1 , b
a1 , ¡1 (s2 , x
b1 + z) , x
b1 + z
a1 ¡ b
a1

¢1

= (· ¡ ·±) z +
! (· ¡ ·±) z,

³

b1 (s2 , x
a1 , ¡
b1) , x
b1
a1 , b
a1 ¡ b
a1

´

so that some su¢ciently small a1 > b
a1 is a better response than b
a1, again contradicting our assumption that s is an equilibrium.
As already noted, our argument follows that in Frankel, Morris and Pauzner
(2001). Two features of the current environment simplify the argument. First,
with an incomplete information interpretation, we have a private value global
game, where a player knows his own payo¤ function; in FMP, a player’s type was
a signal of a common type; as noise goes to zero, this distinction is not important
but requires extra technical work. Second, here we assumed A7 [Stochastically Ordered Marginals] and A8 [Uniformly Bounded Marginals on Di¤erences], whereas
FMP assumed only that each player observed a noisy signal of a common type,
and showed that A7 and A8 held in the limit as noise goes to zero, under quite
general assumptions. However, with our extra assumptions, Proposition 4.1 o¤ers
two small improvements (using the same argument). First, there is a uniqueness
result that can be applied away from the limit. Second, the above theorem applies
to the more general class of interaction games, not just to average utility games.
Of course, the latter assumption is standard and natural for the incomplete information interpretation.
The uniformly bounded marginal on di¤erences condition is key to the uniqueness result. We now note that how this condition is automatically satisÞed in the
two settings outlined in the introduction: when there is su¢ciently large independent heterogeneity (the global heterogeneity case) and su¢ciently small correlated
heterogeneity (the local heterogeneity case).
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4.2.1. Global Heterogeneity Su¢cient Condition
Let

µ

x1 ¡ y
f (x1, x2 ) = h
¾

¶ µ
¶
x2 ¡ y
h
¾

where h(·) is a bounded density with zero mean (with c.d.f. H). Thus x1 and x2
are i.i.d. from a distribution with mean y and scaling parameter ¾. Observe that
f automatically satisÞes stochastically ordered marginals. Now
µ
¶
xi + ¢ ¡ y
Fi ( xi + ¢| xi ) = H
¾
µ
¶
xi + ¢ ¡ y
dFi
1
and
( xi + ¢| xi ) =
h
;
dxi
¾
¾
thus f has ±-bounded marginals on di¤erences if and only if
1
h (´) á ±
¾
for all ´, i.e.,
suph (´)
¾¸

´

.
±
Thus for any ± and bounded h, f satisÞes ±-bounded marginals on di¤erences for
su¢ciently large ¾. Thus su¢cient independent heterogeneity guarantees uniqueness.
4.2.2. Local Heterogeneity Su¢cient Condition
Let
f (x1, x2 ) =

Z1

µ=¡1

g

µ

µ¡y
¿

¶ µ
¶ µ
¶
x1 ¡ µ
x2 ¡ µ
h
h
dµ
¾
¾

where h(·) and g (·) are densities with zero mean.7 Thus x1 and x2 can be thought
of as conditionally independent signals of an unknown µ. Thus each player i’s
payo¤ has a common term µ and an idiosyncratic term xi ¡ µ that player i cannot

7
Note that this example may fail assumption A7 (stochastically ordered marginals), but as
noted above, FMP showed that this assumption is automatically satisÞed for su¢ciently small
¾.
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distinguish. This has the private value global game interpretation. The argument
of Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2001) shows that for su¢ciently small ¾ and/or
su¢ciently large ¿, this f will satisfy the ±-bounded marginals on di¤erences for
any given ±.

5. Multipliers
We now discuss the strategic multipliers in this setting. We focus on the smooth
symmetric case described in section 3.4.2, where there b (a, x) describes any player’s
best response if the average action of his opponents is a and his type is x. We will
assume assumptions A1 through A8 throughout this section.
5.1. Complete Information Analysis
Cooper and John (1988) analyze essentially this model under the assumption
that x is common across players and common knowledge, so that the players are
involved in a symmetric complete information game. We deÞne A¤ (x) to be the
set of Nash equilibrium actions of that complete information game, i.e.,
A¤ (x) ´ {a : a = b (a, x)} .
Under our maintained assumptions, this set will typically look as plotted in Þgure
2. Now we can ask what happens as x is varied. Let e
a (x) describe an equilibrium
in the neighbourhood of x. Totally di¤erentiating,
de
a
a
@b de
@b
=
+
.
dx
@a dx @x

Re-arranging gives
@b
de
a
= @x @b .
dx
1 ¡ @a

At the largest or smallest equilibrium (and at any locally stable equilibrium) we
@b
< 1. Thus we have the following natural interpretation. The direct
have 0 < @a
e¤ect of changing x on a player’s action is
@b
.
@x
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But via the strategic complementarities, increasing x will also increase your expectations of others actions. Thus there is a complete information multiplier
1
.
@b
1 ¡ @a
Thus the extra strategic e¤ect (or intra-equilibrium e¤ect) is
"
#
@b
@b
@a
@b
@x
1 ¡ @a
Roughly speaking, this is Cooper and John’s formalization of why small actions
by, say, the government can have a large e¤ect on outcomes. This multiplier
exists whether there are multiple equilibria (and we examine the local comparative
@b
< 1
statics of stable equilibria) or there is a unique equilibrium (because @a
everywhere).
5.2. Analysis with Local Heterogeneity
Now suppose that the population is heterogeneous. We will study an interaction
game, with the local interaction interpretation, so f is the distribution of weights.
Suppose that
f (x1, x2 ) =

Z1

µ=¡1

g

µ

µ ¡y
¿

¶ µ
¶ µ
¶
x1 ¡ µ
x2 ¡ µ
h
h
dµ.
¾
¾

We noted in section 4.2.2 that as ¾ ! 0, the uniformly bounded marginals of
di¤erences condition is satisÞed for arbitrarily small ±. Thus proposition 4.1 holds
and there is a unique equilibrium. In fact, games with the average action property
turn out to satisfy a limit uniqueness property studied in FMP: not only is there a
unique equilibrium, but we can characterize the unique equilibrium independent
of the shape of f.8 In particular, for any x, let a¤ (x) be the element in A¤ (x) that
maximizes the area between the best response function and the 450 line. Thus
a¤ (x) = arg max
a

Za

a0 =0
8

(b (a0 , x) ¡ a0 ) da0 .

Morris and Shin (2001b) investigate this publicity multiplier in more detail.
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Thus in the example depicted in Þgure 4, a¤ (x) would be equal to the smallest
equilibrium, since area “A” in Þgure 4 is less than area “B”.
[Figures 4 and 5 here]
At some point x¤ , these areas will be equal, and a¤ (µ) will jump to the largest
equilibrium. See Þgure 5.9
A strategy in the interaction game parameterized by ¾ is a function s : R ! R,
where s (x) is the action chosen under that strategy by a player who observes signal
x. The arguments of Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2000) imply that for each ¾
su¢ciently small, there exists a unique strategy s¾ surviving iterated deletion of
strictly dominated strategies; and as ¾ ! 0, s¾ (x) ! a¤ (x). Thus for small ¾, s¾
will be shaped as in Þgure 6.
[Figure 6 here]
Now consider the sensitivity of players’ actions in the unique equilibrium to
their type x. We will clearly have
ds¾
>0
dx
always. If ¾ is small and x
b is not close to x¤ , then we will have
¯
¯
@b ¯
¤
ds¾ ¯¯
@x x=b
¯ x,a=a (bx)
¼
@b ¯
¯
dx x=bx 1 ¡ @a x=bx,a=a¤ (bx)

This e¤ect consists of the direct e¤ect and the intra-equilibrium strategic e¤ect.
But as ¾ ! 0,
¯
ds¾ ¯¯
! 1.
dx ¯ ¤
x=x

In particular, it tends to 1 at the same rate as ¾1 , i.e., there exists a constant c
such that
¯
¶
µ
ds¾ ¯¯
! c.
¾
dx ¯x=x¤
9

These limit uniqueness properties of expected action games were proved in early versions
of Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2001) using the su¢cient conditions that are contained in the
forthcoming version of the paper.
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Thus there is an inter-equilibrium strategic e¤ect that operates only in the neighbourhood of x¤ and is (locally) orders of magnitude larger than the complete
information multiplier.
Formally, then, for any Þxed ¾, we would deÞne the three e¤ects as follows:
Direct E¤ect DM (b
x) =
Intra-Equilibrium E¤ect IM1 (b
x) =
=
Inter-Equilibrium E¤ect IM2 (b
x) =

x) , x
b)
@b (s¾ (b
@x
#
"
1

"

@b(s¾ (b
x),b
x)
@a
@b(s¾ (b
x),b
x)
@a
¡ @b(s¾@a(bx),bx)

1¡

#

DM (b
x) ¡ DM (b
x)

DM (b
x)
1
x)
ds¾ (b
¡ IM1 (b
x)
dx

This classiÞcation suggests a useful qualitative distinction between di¤erent kinds
of strategic multiplier. It highlights the observation (emphasized by Michael
Woodford in his discussion of Morris and Shin (2001b)) that the extreme sensitivity in the limit of a global game (i.e., for small ¾) is closely related to the jumps
between complete information equilibria that must occur if there is not common
knowledge. In settings where there is a small amount of local heterogeneity, the
local sensitivity is largest when heterogeneity is small.

6. PuriÞcation
Carlsson and van Damme used the binary action example presented in section
2 to illustrate the relation between puriÞcation and global games. Consider the
model with common and idiosyncratic components of types in section 2.3. As the
idiosyncratic component becomes small (we let ¯ ! 1 for any Þxed ®), the game
has a unique equilibrium. But if ® = 1, so that there is no common component,
then we have independent types for the players. If ¯ is low (¯ á 2¼), there is a
unique equilibrium in this case. But if ¯ is high, so that there is a small amount of
independent idiosyncratic payo¤ shocks, then there are multiple equilibria. This
corresponds exactly to the perturbation of Harsanyi (1973), where he showed that
mixed strategy equilibria can be “puriÞed”. In particular, suppose that y 2 (0, 1)
and common knowledge (i.e., ® = 1). The underlying complete information
game will then have a mixed strategy equilibrium as well as two pure strategy
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equilibria. For high ¯, there will be an equilibrium of the interaction game where
most types play according to the pure strategy equilibrium. But there will also
be an equilibrium where each player employs a cuto¤ strategy in such a way that
the other player’s belief about his play in close to the mixed strategy equilibrium
of the complete information game (and converges to it as ¯ ! 1).10
These results have important implications for social interactions. With heterogenous populations interacting, we might expect to see mixed strategies reßected in population behavior in this way. One implication is that behavior will
be well correlated with player’s types, even though each player is close to indi¤erent between two actions.

7. Conclusion
We have described how global games can be given incomplete information, local interaction and random matching interpretations. We have provided a su¢cient condition for heterogeneous interaction generating uniqueness in games with
strategic complementarities. The su¢cient condition requires that a player’s beliefs about her opponent’s payo¤s di¤er from her payo¤s not be too sensitive to
the level of her payo¤s. This su¢cient condition is tight and contains as special
cases the local heterogeneity arguments of global games and various global heterogeneity arguments with independent interaction. We also saw how strategic
multipliers and puriÞcation can be interpreted across di¤erent interaction settings.

10

An early version of Hellwig (2000) looked at puriÞcation in common value global games.
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Appendix: Private versus Common Value Global Games
The analysis of this paper concerned a private value global game. The literature on global games focuses on common value global games. With small noise
(or local heterogeneity) the distinction is unimportant, but it becomes important
when there is signiÞcant heterogeneity. In this appendix, we describe a simple example that embeds both cases and explore in somewhat more detail the uniqueness
condition that emerges.
Consider the following two player, two action game.

Player 1

Player 2
0
1
0 1, 1 0, µ2
1 µ1 , 0 µ1 , µ2

(7.1)
(7.2)

Let µ be normally distributed with mean y and precision ®; y is common knowledge
and can be interpreted as a public signal about µ; each player i observes a noisy
signal of µ, xi = µ +"i , where "1 and "2 are i.i.d. normal with mean 0 and precision
¯. Finally, µi = qµ + (1 ¡ q) xi (although µi is not observed at the time of the
action choice).
If q = 0, we have the private values model of Carlsson and van Damme (1993)
appendix B and section 2 with the common/idiosyncratic components interpretation. If q = 1, we have the common values model of Morris and Shin (1999a,
2000), where each player observes a noisy signal of a common payo¤ parameter.11
As Carlsson and van Damme (1993) noted, the private and common value models
will behave in very similar ways if ¯ is large relative to ®. We will see below that
they behave very di¤erently if ® is large relative to ¯.
For completeness, we again summarize the argument generating the uniqueness
condition for any q 2 [0, 1], again paralleling well known arguments.
Player 1 will believe that x2 is distributed normally with mean
®y + ¯x1
®+¯
11

Morris and Shin (1999a) analyzed the two player case discussed here. When that paper was
incorporated into Morris and Shin (2000), a continuum player case was discussed, but it was
noted that equilibrium characterization is identical. Morris and Shin (1999b, 2001), Hellwig
(2000) and Metz (2000) also discuss public and private normal signals in (common value) global
games with a variety of other payo¤ functions.
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and precision
¯ (® + ¯)
.
® + 2¯
b, then his
If he believes his opponent is choosing action 0 if and only if x2 ¸ x
expected payo¤ to action 0 is
Ãs
µ
¶!
¯ (® + ¯)
®y + ¯x1
©
x
b¡
;
® + 2¯
®+¯
and his expected payo¤ to action 1 is
µ
µ
¶
¶
µ
¶
®y + ¯x1
q®
q®
q
+ (1 ¡ q) x1 =
y+ 1¡
x1 .
®+¯
®+¯
®+¯

Thus the gain to choosing action 1 rather than action 0 when he has observed
signal x and thinks his opponent is following a switching strategy with cuto¤ x
b is
Ãs
µ
¶
µ
¶
µ
¶!
q®
¯ (® + ¯)
q®
®y + ¯x
u (x, x
b) =
y+ 1¡
x¡©
x
b¡
.
®+¯
®+¯
® + 2¯
®+¯

Observe that

U (x) = u (x, x)
Ãs
µ
¶
µ
¶
µ
¶!
q®
¯ (® + ¯)
q®
®y + ¯x
=
y+ 1¡
x¡©
x¡
®+¯
®+¯
® + 2¯
®+¯
s
Ã
!
µ
¶
µ
¶
µ
¶
q®
®
¯ (® + ¯)
q®
=
y+ 1¡
x¡©
(x ¡ y) .
®+¯
®+¯
® + 2¯
®+¯
If U (b
x) = 0, then there is an equilibrium of this game where each player chooses
action 0 if his signal is below x
b and chooses action 1 if his signal is above x
b. If
we let x and x be the smallest and largest solutions to the equation U (x) = 0,
then action 1 is rationalizable for player i if and only if xi ¸ x and action 0 is
rationalizable if and only if xi á x.
Thus there is a unique rationalizable action for (almost) all types if and only
if the equation U (x) = 0 has a unique solution. Observe that U (x) ! ¡1 as
x ! ¡1 and U (x) ! 1 as x ! 1. So, a su¢cient condition for the equation to
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have a unique solution is that U 0 (x) ¸ 0 for all x. But observe that if U 0 (x) < 0
for some y, we could choose another x0 and y0 such that the equation had multiple
solutions. So, there is a unique rationalizable action for (almost) all types and for
all y if and only if the equation U 0 (x) ¸ 0 for all x.
q®
U 0 (x) = 1 ¡
¡
®+¯

s

¯ (® + ¯)
® + 2¯

µ

®
®+¯

!
¶ Ãs
µ
¶
®
¯ (® + ¯)
Á
(x ¡ y) .
® + 2¯
®+¯

Thus we must have
q®
1¡
¡
®+¯

s

¯ (® + ¯)
® + 2¯

µ

®
®+¯

¶

1
p ¸ 0.
2¼

Re-writing, this gives
where
Ãs

°e (®, ¯, q) á 2¼

(7.3)

!!2
µ
¶Ã
®
¯ (® + ¯)
1
° (®, ¯, q) =
e
q®
® + 2¯
®+¯
1 ¡ ®+¯
µ
¶2 µ
¶2
®+¯
®
¯ (® + ¯)
=
® + 2¯
®+¯
® (1 ¡ q) + ¯
¶
µ
2
¯®
®+¯
=
.
® + 2¯ (® (1 ¡ q) + ¯)2
So the necessary and su¢cient condition for uniqueness is:
¶
µ
®+¯
¯®2
á 2¼
® + 2¯ (® (1 ¡ q) + ¯)2

(7.4)

In the pure common values case, where q = 1, this reduces to the condition of
Morris and Shin (1999a, 2000b):
µ ¶
® + ¯ ®2
° (®, ¯, 1) =
e
.
(7.5)
® + 2¯ ¯

For any Þxed ®, (7.4) will hold for all ¯ su¢ciently large and fail for all ¯ su¢ciently small. This result illustrates the equilibrium selection result of Carlsson
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and van Damme. More precisely, there is a unique rationalizable action if and
only if
¶
µ
q
®
2
¯¸
® ¡ 2¼ + (® ¡ 2¼) + 16® .
8¼
For large ®, requiring that e
° (®, ¯, 1) á 2¼ is equivalent to requiring that ¯ ¸
See Þgure 7.
[Figure 7 here]

®2
.
4¼

In the special case where q = 0, this reduces to the case analyzed in section 2
and we have
µ
¶
¯®2
1
.
° (®, ¯, 0) =
e
® + 2¯ ® + ¯

Thus (7.4) is equivalent to (2.7) in the text. Recall that if we followed Ui (2001)
in re-parameterizing the private values global game in terms of correlation and
unconditional variance, we got the simple and easy to interpret uniqueness condition (2.6). But for comparison with the common value global game (where such
a simple re-parameterization is not available), we here analyze in more detail the
uniqueness condition in terms of the precisions of public and private components.
Note that the cuto¤ values of uniqueness occur when
µ
¶
¯®2
1
= 2¼.
® + 2¯ ® + ¯
Re-arranging the equation, we get the quadratic
4¼¯ 2 + ® (6¼ ¡ ®) ¯ + 2¼®2 = 0.
This has two solutions,
¸
·
q
®
2
¯=
® ¡ 6¼ ± (® ¡ 6¼) ¡ 32¼2 .
8¼
There are three cases to consider.
1. If

³
p ´
® á 2¼ 3 ¡ 2 2 ,

the quadratic has real solutions, but both are negative; in this case, e
° (®, ¯, 0) <
2¼ for all ¯.
35

2. If

³
p ´
p ´
2¼ 3 ¡ 2 2 < ® < 2¼ 3 + 2 2 ,
³

then the quadratic has no real solutions; again, e
° (®, ¯, 0) < 2¼ for all ¯.
p ¢
¡
3. If ® ¸ 2¼ 3 + 2 2 , then the quadratic has two real solutions:
¸
·
q
®
2
2
® ¡ 6¼ ¡ (® ¡ 6¼) ¡ 32¼
¯ (®) =
8¼
¸
·
q
®
2
2
and ¯ (®) =
® ¡ 6¼ + (® ¡ 6¼) ¡ 32¼ ;
8¼
in this case, °e (®, ¯, 0) á 2¼ for all ¯ á ¯ (®) and for all ¯ ¸ ¯ (®). But
°e (®, ¯, 0) > 2¼ for all ¯ (®) < ¯ < ¯ (®).

p ¢
¡
Observe that 2¼ 3 + 2 2 ¼ 36.6 and
³ ³
³ ³
p ´´
p ´´ ³
p ´
¯ 2¼ 3 + 2 2 = ¯ 2¼ 3 + 2 2 = 4 + 3 2 ¼ ¼ 25.9.

Also observe

So as ® ! 1,

¸
·
q
®
2
2
¯ (®) =
® ¡ 6¼ ¡ (® ¡ 6¼) ¡ 32¼
8¼
¸
·q
q
®
2
2
2
=
(® ¡ 6¼) ¡ (® ¡ 6¼) ¡ 32¼
8¼
2
¢ 3
¡
2
2
2
® 4 (® ¡ 6¼) ¡ (® ¡ 6¼) ¡ 32¼
5
q
q
=
8¼
2
2
2
(® ¡ 6¼) + (® ¡ 6¼) ¡ 32¼
3
2
2
® 4
32¼
5
q
q
=
8¼
2
2
2
(® ¡ 6¼) + (® ¡ 6¼) ¡ 32¼

But also as ® ! 1,

¯ (®) ! 2¼.
1
¯ (®)
=
.
2
®
4¼
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p ¢
¡
To summarize, there is multiplicity if and only if ® > 2¼ 3 + 2 2 and ¯ (®) á
¯ á ¯ (®). See Þgure 8.
[Figure 8]
What about the intermediate case, where 0 < q < 1? While the corresponding
equations are a little messier, this case behaves qualitatively like the private values
case. In particular, Þxing q 2 (0, 1), we will have that for ® su¢ciently small,
we have e
° (®, ¯, q) < 2¼. For larger ®, we will have e
° (®, ¯, q) á 2¼ as long
as ¯ is either su¢ciently small or su¢ciently large. As ® ! 1, we will get
°e (®, ¯, q) á 2¼ as long as either
¯ á 2¼ (1 ¡ q)2

or
¯¸

®2
.
4¼
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